Henry R. Cheeseman is a professor at the University of Southern California Marshall School of Business, where he teaches graduate courses on business law subjects, including employment law. He has practiced law and also taught business organizations and banking law courses at the Gould School of Law at the University of Southern California. Professor Cheeseman received a bachelor of science from Marquette University, a Juris Doctor from the UCLA School of Law, a Masters in Business Taxation from the University of Southern California, a Masters of Business Administration from the University of Chicago, and an LL.M. degree from Boston University. He has written more than 30 business law textbooks and has won numerous teaching awards at the University of Southern California.
Business Law 5Th Edition Cheeseman
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The fact that the borrowing may have been advantageous for federal estate tax purposes does not evidence a purpose unrelated to the taxpayers' purchase and holding a [sic] tax-exempt securities. Rather the absence of any adequate business justification for the loans compels the conclusion that the taxpayer borrowed money in order to retain his or her tax-exempts.
European colonialism in the late 19th century created territorial units that a few decades later provided the basis for the creation of legislatures. The first of these institutions emerged as advisory councils to governors, with virtually no legislative authority. And even after colonial legislative councils (LegCos) and conseils généraux were founded, the metropolitan legislatures in Europe retained ultimate lawmaking authority. To enforce this form of remote control over colonial legislatures, governors were typically empowered to appoint a plurality of legislators (Ojwang, 1980; Okafor, 1981). In most cases, membership to colonial legislatures was initially limited to European immigrants and business interests. Substantive African membership became commonplace after the Second World War as nationalist fervor swept across the region. 2ff7e9595c
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